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Abstract—Code virtualization built upon virtual machine (VM)
technologies is emerging as a viable method for implementing
code obfuscation to protect programs against unauthorized
analysis. State-of-the-art VM-based protection approaches use
a fixed set of virtual instructions and bytecode interpreters
across programs. This, however, exposes a security vulnerability
where an experienced attacker can use knowledge extracted
from other programs to quickly uncover the mapping between
virtual instructions and native code for applications protected
under the same scheme. In this paper, we propose a novel VM-
based code obfuscation system to address this problem. The core
idea of our approach is to obfuscate the mapping between the
opcodes of bytecode instructions and their semantics. We achieve
this by partitioning each protected code region into multiple
segments where the mapping of opcodes and their semantics
is randomized in different ways in different segments. In this
way, each bytecode instruction will be translated into different
native code in different sections of the obfuscated code. This
significantly increases the diversity of the program behavior. As
a result, the knowledge of bytecode to native code mappings
obtained from other programs will be less useful when targeting
a new program. We evaluate our approach on a set of real-world
applications and compare it against two state-of-the-art VM-
based code obfuscation approaches. Experimental results show
that our simple approach is effective, which provides stronger
protection at the cost of little extra overhead.
Index Terms—Virtualized obfuscation, reverse engineering,
instruction set randomization, analysis knowledge
I. INTRODUCTION
Unauthorized code reverse engineering is a major concern
for software developers. It is often exploitted by adversaries
to perform various attacks, including removing copyright
protection of software, taking out advertisements from the
application, or injecting malicious code into the program.
By making the program harder to be traced and analyzed,
code obfuscation is a viable means to protect software against
unauthorized code modification [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6].
Code virtualization based on a virtual machine (VM) is
emerging as a promising way for implementing code obfusca-
tion [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. This strategy forces
the attacker to move from a familiar instruction set to an
unfamiliar environment, which can significantly increase the
time and effort involved in the attack.
Reverse engineering of VM-obfuscated code typically fol-
lows several steps. The attack first reverse-engineers the virtual
interpreter to understand the semantics of individual byte-
code instructions. Then translates the bytecode back to native
machine instructions or even high-level program languages
to understand the program logic [14], [15]. Among these
steps, understanding the semantics of individual bytecode
instructions is often the most-consuming process, which is
involved in analysing the handler that used to interpret every
bytecode instruction.
Numerous approaches have been proposed to protect VM
handlers from reverse engineering. Most of them aim to
increase the diversity of program behavior by obfuscating
the handler implementation [13] or iteratively transforming a
single program multiple times using different interpretation
techniques [10], [11]. However, all prior work employ a fixed
strategy where each bytecode is deterministically translated
to a fixed set of native code. Such techniques are vulnerable
for programs protected under the same obfuscation technique.
In particular, an attacker can reuse the knowledge (termed
analysis knowledge) of the handler implementation obtained
from one program to launch the attack on another program.
We present DCVP (Code Virtualization Protection with
Diversity), an enhanced VM-based code obfuscation system to
address the issue of reusing analysis knowledge. We employ
a technique called Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) [16]
to randomly change the opcodes of bytecode instructions
and their semantics; so that the mapping between bytecodes
and their handlers varies across programs. The randomization
itself, however, is not sufficient for providing stronger pro-
tection, because it is easy to be bypassed due to the non-
uniform distribution of the bytecode instructions (e.g. the
more frequent a bytecode is used, the more likely the relation
between the bytecode and its handlers can be obtained from
other programs). To overcome this issue, DCVP partitions the
protected code region into several parts where the mappings
of bytecode instructions and their handlers in each part are
different. As a result, the same bytecode instruction in different
parts of the program will have different semantics.
The key contribution of this paper is a countermeasure to ad-
dress the issue of reusing analysis knowledge for code reverse
engineering. We compare our approach against VMProtect [8]
and Themida [9] on a set of real-world Intel x86 applications
and algorithms. Experimental results show that DCVP provides
stronger protection at the cost of little extra overhead. It is to
note that our work focuses on protecting code against code
reverse engineering. Like any code obfuscation technique,
malware developers could also exploit this to protect malicious





































Fig. 1: A representative architecture for VM-based obfuscation. The main
work of this paper is to improve the core steps of VM-based protection (areas
marked as “a” and “b”). In the first region (a), we partition the protected code
region into different segments, and obfuscate the bytecode handlers to
generate multiple implementations for each handler. In the second region
(b), we use a number of obfuscation and anti-taint analysis technologies to
protect the important components of the VM core.
programs, but preventing this is outside the scope of this work.
II. BACKGROUND
Virtualization techniques is widely used to protect software
programs from unauthorized analyses. Examples of VM-based
code obfuscation tools include VMProtect [8], Code Virtual-
izer [7] and [9]. Code obfuscation often comes at a cost, with
bloating code size and longer execution time. To minimize
the overhead, in practice only critical parts of the software are
obfuscated [17]. VM-based protection works by transforming
the native machine code of the protected code region into a set
of bespoke virtual instructions which are stored as bytecode
in the program binary. At runtime, the virtual instructions will
be translated into native code using byte interpreters.
Figure 1 illustrates a classical VM-based obfuscation sys-
tem. At the heart of this system are the virtual IS (Instruction
Set) and the set of interpreters used to translate the IS to native
code. Interpretation of virtual instructions follows the classical
decode-dispatch approach [18], using a bundle of handlers
and a VMloop. Here, the VMloop is the execution engine
which fetches and decodes a bytecode instruction and then
dispatches a handler to interpret instruction. VMcontext,
which contains hardware-independent virtual registers and
flags. At runtime, the virtual registers and flags will be
mapped down to the underlying hardware, and the VMInit
is responsible for saving the native context and initializing
the VMcontext. In comparison, VMExit restores the native
context when exiting VM. Finally, these VM components will
be assembled into a new section and attached to the end of
the target program through binary rewriting.
Our work focuses on two key components of the VM-based
obfuscation architecture, highlighted using labels ‘a’ and ’b’
in Figure 1. Our approach divides the protected code region
to different sections. It generates multiple implementations
for each bytecode handler using code obfuscation techniques.
Different implementations of the same bytecode handler are
semantically equivalent and will produce an identical output
for a given virtual instruction; but they follow different ex-
ecution paths and exhibit diverse behavior during runtime.
We further enhance the strength of the protection by using
a number of obfuscation and anti-taint analysis technologies
to protect the important components of the VMCore.
III. THE THREAT MODEL
In our threat model, we assume an attacker owns a copy of
the target application and can run it in a malicious host envi-
ronment [19]. Such a threat model is also known as the white-
box attack [20], [21]. In such an environment, the adversary
has full privileged accesses to the system. We also assume the
adversary can use static and dynamic analysis tools, such as
IDA [22], OllyDbg [23] and Sysinternals Suite [24],
to trace and analyze instructions, monitor registers and process
memory, and modify instruction bytes and control flows at
runtime, etc. Prior work has demonstrated that these are reason
assumptions [14], which are often available to an experienced
adversary.
There are two preliminarily used methods to attack VM-
based protection systems. Our work assumes an adversary can
use any of or a combination of the methods to launch the
attack. These two methods are described as follows.
The first technique is based on the virtual execution analysis
proposed by Rolles et al. [15]. This requires an analyst to have
a deep understanding of the code virtualization techniques
employed by the obfuscation system. It works by dynamically
tracking the execution process of the virtual interpreter to
extract the key bytecodes and handlers, and then through the
analysis and code simplification to recover the program logic.
Falliere et al. [14] show that it is possible to perform the above
analysis [8]. This type of attack method is closely related to
the principle and structure of code virtualization, and has been
widely adopted to analyze obfuscated malware.
The second technique is based on behavior and semantic
analysis of the target program. This type of attack method can
be used to attack not only code virtualization but also other
obfuscation methods. Coogan et al. [25] propose a behavior
based analysis method. Their approach aims to analyze impor-
tant behavior of code, but it does not pay attention to restoring
the original code. Yadegari et al. [26] propose a method based
on semantic analysis. The method uses taint propagation to
track the flow of inputs values, and semantics-preserving code
transformations to simplify the logic of the instructions. This
type of method has wider applicability, but is restricted to a
small code region.
IV. MOTIVATION
Figure 2 depicts an reverse analysis scenario where an
analyst can reuse the analysis knowledge to attack applications
protected by the same VM-based code obfuscation scheme. In
this example, there are four different programs to be protected,
labelled as A, B, C and D. In the right side of the diagram,
all the four programs are protected using an identical set of
virtual instructions and bytecode handlers.
Under this setting, an experienced analyst would be able
to use the knowledge of the mapping of virtual instructions
and bytecode handlers obtained from one program to reverse-
engineer the other three programs. Bear in mind that, uncover-
ing the mapping between virtual instructions and native code
is often the most time-consuming process for attacking VM-
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Fig. 2: The process of reusing attacking knowledge for code reverse engineer-
ing. Here we have four different target programs, A, B, C and D. In the right
side of the scenario, all programs are obfuscated with a code obfuscation
scheme that a virtual instruction will be deterministically translated to a
fixed set of native code. This allows an attacker to reuse knowledge obtained
from one program to efficiently reverse engineer other programs. In another
scenario, the mapping between virtual instructions and native code is different
for different programs. In this way, the attacker is unable to reuse the
previously extracted knowledge to perform reverse analysis across programs.
knowledge thus can significantly reduce the cost involved in
the attack. In another scenario, the translations between virtual
instructions and native code vary among programs. Therefore,
the knowledge obtained from one program will be inapplicable
to others. This forces the analyst to start from the scratch when
reverse engineering a new program. This example shows that
shuffle the relationship between the virtual instructions and
bytecode handlers can significantly increase the effort and cost
involved in performing the attack. In the remainder sections of
the paper, we describe how we can construct such as scheme
in details.
V. OVERVIEW
DCVP consists of four components, described as follows.
Virtual Instruction Set and Handlers. The native machine
instructions within the target code region are translated into
bespoke virtual instructions and stored as bytecode in the
program binary. The virtual instructions will be decoded by
the handlers during runtime. A virtual instruction can be
decoded by multiple semantically-equivalent handlers. A brief
description of the design of a virtual instruction set is given
in Section VI.
Native code translation. We develop a tool to automatically
translate the native machine code into virtual instructions and
stored as bytecode. This is detailed in Section VII-A.
Bytecode diversification. The generated bytecode instructions
will be diversified using a special encoding scheme. Each
protected code region is partitioned to multiple segments and
the opcodes of the virtual instructions in each segment will be
mapped to different native code. This means that a mapping
from opcode to native code found at one segment is likely to
be inapplicable for other segments. This is the key component
of DCVP, presented at Section VII-B.
PE Refactoring. Finally, the generated bytecode program and
other VM components will be linked together through binary
rewriting.
VI. VIRTUAL INSTRUCTION SET AND HANDLERS
The virtual instruction set and their handlers are the founda-
tions of any VM-based code obfuscation system. The virtual
instruction set must be Turing-equivalent to target native
machine code. This means that any native instruction could
be substituted with some virtual instructions without violating
the semantics of the original code. Virtual instructions will be
interpreted by the hand-crafted handlers during program
execution. It is to note that the instruction handlers are
written in native instructions.
There are two mainstream approaches for implementing
a VM: a stack-based approach and a register-based one. In
this paper, we choose to use the stack-based architecture to
implement DCVP for the following reasons:
• In a stack-based VM, operations are carried out with the
help of stack, where operands and results of operations
are stored. This simplifies the addressing of operands and
ultimately simplifies the implementation of handlers.
• The process of converting native x86 instructions to
virtual instructions is simpler compared to a register-
based alternative.
• Stack-based VMs require more virtual instructions for
a given computation; this makes the instructions more
complex and conforms to our objective of impeding
reverse analysis.
A na¨ive approach to design a virtual instruction set that
is semantically equivalent to the native instruction set, is to
map every single native instruction to a virtual instruction.
However, this would require us to implement a large number
of instruction handlers as our goal is to provide multiple
handlers for a single virtual instructions. We choose a different
approach that has a lower implementation cost, by exploiting
the characteristics of a stack-based VM. Our design choice
is based on the following observation. In a stack VM, a
native operation is either executed or virtualized a three-step
fashion: (i) pushing the operand into the stack, (ii) executing
an operation, and (iii) storing the result into the execution
context. Therefore, we can use the following, smaller number
of instructions to implement a virtual instruction set:
• We need load and store instructions for data transfers.
load instructions are for pushing operands into the stack,
and store instructions are for popping results out of the
stack and storing the results back the virtual context.
• We need arithmetical and logical instructions. The num-
ber of these virtual instructions needed are smaller than
their Intel x86 counterparts, as the addressing mode
of operands is simpler and uniform (i.e., stack-based
memory addressing).
• Branch instructions for changing the control flow of the
bytecode program.
Other instructions that are not included in the above cat-
egories are defined as special virtual instructions, and are
labelled as undef, When encountering such an instruction
at time, we will first restore the native context and exits the
VM. Then, we execute the undefined native instruction in the
native context and re-enter the VM to continue executing the
remaining bytecode instructions.
VII. OFFLINE CODE OBFUSCATION
We now describe how to translate native instruction instruc-
tions to virtual instructions and store them in the bytecode
format.
A. Native Instructions to Virtual Instructions
At code obfuscation time, we first convert native instructions
into virtual instructions. This conversion process follows the
three-step execution process in a stack-based VM, which is
described in Section VI. Specifically, we first load the operands
into stack with the load virtual instruction; then, we execute
the ready to execute operation; and store the result into virtual
context or a certain memory address with store virtual
instructions.
Native data transfer instructions are mainly mapped into
load and store instructions. Examples of such instructions
in the x86 instruction set include mov, push, and pop.
Arithmetical and logical instructions will be translated by
strictly following the aforementioned three-phase processing,
and branch instructions are mapped into a load instruction
followed by a virtual branching instruction. Native instructions
with complex addressing modes are processed iteratively using
a combination of the aboved virtual instructions.
B. Virtual Instructions to Bytecodes
Virtual instructions will be encoded into bytecodes in the
end. It is similar to that an assembler assembles assembly
instructions into machine code and only can be interpreted by
virtual interpreter of VM-based protection system. We adopt
an encoding scheme less compacted than the x86 instruction
architecture which uses separate bytes for the opcode and
operand of a virtual instruction. In practice, we assign each
virtual instruction a distinct ID as its opcode. The ID is used
by VMloop as an index to find the address of the handler
of the virtual instruction in the address table recording the
addresses of each handler. Since the number of virtual
instructions is less than 256, thus one byte is sufficient to
encode their IDs. As for the operands, since they could be of
different size1, we use one, two, or four bytes to encode them
correspondingly.
1) Randomize the Semantics of Bytecode Instructions:
From the above demonstration, if an analyst gets known
the semantics of a bytecode instruction, the next time she
encounters it, she does not bother to analyze its handler
once again to figure out what it does2. For example, in Figure
3, the bytecode instruction "10" means an addition operation
through analyzing Handler 4023e0. The next time we
1The operand of a virtual instruction could be an index for virtual register,
an immediate value, or a memory address. They could be of different size:
a virtual register index being 8 bits, an immediate value being 8/16/32 bits,
and a memory address being 32 bits.
2Since handlers could be mutated to hinder analysis, it saves an analyst
a lot of time end effort without bothering to analyze them once again.
00 02:  load_r 02
00 03:  load_r 03
10   :  add32


























Fig. 3: Examples of some virtual instructions and their bytecode. Each virtual
instruction is encoded into a bytecode instruction, which consists of an opcode
and optionally an operand. The bytecode instructions feed into VMloop and
the opcode of each bytecode instruction is used by VMloop as an index to
find the address of the corresponding handler in the HAT (Handler Address
Table).
encounter a bytecode instruction of "10", we could say that
it does an addition operation immediately.
To mitigate the effect of reuse of previously obtained
analysis knowledge, we randomize the semantics of virtual
instructions. According to the encoding scheme we adopt, it is
easy to achieve this goal. The idea is to change the relationship
between the IDs (opcodes) and the virtual instructions, which
is similar to [16]. Every time to encode the virtual instructions,
the IDs are first shuffled once. Then the shuffled IDs are
used to encode the virtual instructions. The addresses of
handlers are also filled into the handler address table
accordingly.
2) Partition Bytecode Program: With the randomization
of the semantics of bytecode instructions, an analyst can
not directly reuse her analysis knowlege to work out what
a bytecode instruction actually does. However, the effect of
the randomization could be easily bypassed. The frequencies
of virtual instructions are not uniform, where load r and
store r are two of the most frequently used virtual instruc-
tions. Thus, an analyst could infer the semantics of bytecode
instructions based on the non-uniform frequencies of opcodes.
3) Bytecode Program Partitioning: To obfustrate the infer-
ences based on the frequencies of opcodes, we partition all the
generated virtual instructions into several parts, each part been
encoded differently. Specifically, during obfuscation, instead
of encoding the generated virtual instructions all at a time,
we encode those resulted parts separately. And prior to each
encoding process, we first randomly shuffle the IDs of virtual
instructions and then use the results for encoding. The effect
of the shuffles is that an identical opcode in different parts
of the bytecode program probably reveals different semantics,
thus the frequencies of opcodes are obscured . Figure 4 shows
an example of partitioning the virtual instructions into two
parts. The opcode of a virtual instruction is probably encoded
differently in different parts. For example, load r is encoded
into "00" in the first part, while "7a" in the other.
00 03:  load_r 03
10   :  add32
93   :  switch_HAT
7a 05:  load_r 05
17   :  add32
52   :  switch_HAT


























402300   4023e0  4024a6   

















Fig. 4: Example of partitioning virtual instructions into several parts (two
parts in this figure). Virtual instructions in different partitions are encoded
differently and interpreted using different handlers set. The number of
HAT increases accordingly. To switch the currently used (by VMloop) HAT
to the next one, we add a new virtual instruction switch HAT. The operand












Fig. 5: The virtualization of a direct inner transfer instruction with HAT
switching. The address of the destination HAT is pushed into stack by
load i, and is assigned to the HAT pointer used by VMloop at runtime.
As the opcodes of bytecode instructions are used by
VMloop as the indexes for the addresses of their corre-
sponding handlers, and different partitions are encoded
differently, each partition needs their own HAT. At the end
of a partition, the HAT used by VMloop should be switched
to the HAT of the next partition. This is done by a new
virtual instruction - switch HAT. Since switch HAT is
always added to the end of a partition and the orders of HATs
are in accordance with that of the partitions, switch HAT
needs to add the size of a HAT to the HAT pointer used by
VMloop (as Handler 4024a6 does in figure 4). In our
prototype, the number of Handlers is 148 and the address
of a Handler is 4 bytes, thus the size of a HAT is 592
(250h in hexadecimal) bytes.
The switchings of HATs is not limited to the end of parti-
tions. A branch instruction also causes the switching when its
destination resides in a different partition. Branch instructions
change the control flow of a program through changing the
VPC. When encounter such an instruction, we cannot simply
append a switch HAT to it, since the switch HAT may
not get interpreted by VMloop if the VPC is changed to
a location in another partition. Hence, we put the code for
switching inside the Handlers of the branch instructions.
Here, the branch instructions indicate the direct inner ones, as
direct outer branches and indirect branches all leave the virtual
context and need not to worry about the switching of HATs.
During protection, for each direct inner branch instruction,
we first calculate its destination, and then figure out which
partition the destination resides. The address of the HAT of
that partition is pushed into stack by load i and will be
used by the Handler of the branch instruction to set the
value of the HAT pointer used by VMloop. Figure 5 shows
the virtualization of a direct inner branch instruction.
4) Security Analysis of Partition Design: The number of
HAS obfuscated is determined by the number of partitions.
Our system will randomly select several methods from the
obfuscation method library which contains the junk instruc-
tions injection, equivalent instruction substitution [27], code
out-of-order [28] and control flow flattening [29]. Then the
system will use the selected method in a random order to
obfuscate the handler. Finally we have multiple equivalent
but different forms of HAS. We will also adopt some anti-taint
analysis techniques (some details are presented in section III)
to protect the HAS that after obfuscated. This can effectively
prevent the virtual interpreter from being attacked by some
de-obfuscation methods.
For example, HAS (Handler Set) as an original handler
set that consists of m handler. We use a HAT to store the
address of these handlers, and their index corresponds to
the opcode of virtual instruction. HAS will be obfuscated for n
times with different strategies, n is dependent on the number of
partitions. Then we get multiple HASs and which are semantic
equivalence but have different forms. At this time, all of the
equivalent handlers still have the same index. This is a
type of insecure and direct mapping relationship. Therefore,
according to the method that partitions bytecode program and
randomizes the semantics of bytecode instructions described
in Section VII-B2, we first randomly shuffle the IDs of virtual
instructions and then use these results to generate a new HAT
for each partition (as shown in Figure 4). The effect of shuffles
is that an identical opcode in different parts of the bytecode
program probably reveals different semantics. The relationship
of these equivalent handlers in different HASs should be:
HAS1(i)⇔HAS2(j)⇔ ... ⇔HASn(k), 1≤i, j, k≤m.
This various semantics of bytecode instructions and different
forms of handlers can effectively prevent the attacker from
using the attack knowledge base matching to realize the
automated reverse analysis. The attacker has to spend a lot
of time to analyze every detail.
The above methods can prevent the spread of tainted data by
laundering tainted data and resist the taint analysis effectively
.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of DCVP
by computing the likelihood of a bytecode instruction of two
partitions to be mapped to an identical machine code. We
then evaluate the overhead of DCVP in terms of code size
and running time.
TABLE I: Statistics of the Target Programs.
Target Program Version Size(KB) Critical Code N1 N2 Ratio N3
md5 2.3 11 Transform() 1327 563 42.36% 85013
gzip 1.2.4 56 deflate() 10181 153 1.50% 539082
bcrypt 1.1.2 68 Blowfish Encrypt() 2997 54 1.80% 1735710
mat mul - 184 ijkalgorithm() 49327 60 0.12% 84325
Note:The 5th and 6th column gives the number of instructions in the entire program and these critical functions respectively, The 7th column gives the
proportion of critical code. We use Pin [30] to count the number of the dynamically executed instructions in the critical functions and the results are shown
in the last column. We chose only 60 instructions of mat mul is special to verify the impact of DCVP on the program overhead when protecting a small
amount of code. The results are shown in figure 8 and the impact is not obvious.
A. Effectiveness Evaluation
DCVP is effective for impeding reverse analysis by invalidat-
ing existing analysis knowledge. From Section II, we learned
that understanding the semantics of bytecode instructions is
essential for reverse engineering a VM-obfuscated program.
Semantics are encapsulated in handlers, and the work of
extracting them form handlers is tedious and error-prone.
Therefore, it will save analysts lots of time and energy if the
semantics of bytecode instructions are accessible,
without bothering to trace and analyze the handlers
once again. DCVP’s aim is to frustrate this attempt and
force analysts to analyze the handlers every time. Through
randomizing the semantics of bytecode instructions, the same
bytecode instruction probably means different obfuscated in-
stances, and even different in the same obfuscated program by
adopting different encoding schemes for different partitions of
the bytecode program, which can largely confuse analysts and
increase their workload.
Assuming that the number of virtual instructions, or the
number of handlers in other words, is H , then the prob-
ability of a bytecode instruction in two obfuscated programs
having the same semantics is 1H . The total number of distinct
shuffle of the opcodes is H!. In an obfuscated program,
supposing the bytecode program is partitioned into N parts,
then the probability that a bytecode instruction in different






we believe DCVP can effectively remove the analysis knowlege
about the semantics of bytecode instructions.
We also count the average frequencies of opcodes of our
benchmarks. We take the obfuscated programs with 2, 8,
and 32 partitions for comparison. The results are presented
in figure 6. As we can see, as the number of partitions
increases, the frequencies of opcodes tend to be closer. When
the partition number is 1, we can easily get the instruction that
has the highest frequency is “load r”, since it is the most
commonly used instruction.
B. Overhead Evaluation
To evaluate the spatial and temporal overhead of our
method, we implemented a prototype, namely DCVP, for
obfuscating x86 PE executables on the Windows platform.
In the implementation, we devised 148 virtual instructions
and their corresponding handlers. We conducted all the
experiments on a Dell Optiplex 960h with an Intel®CoreTM 2


































Fig. 6: The average frequency of an opcode is used during runtime execution.
The x-axis shows the opcode ID and the y-axis shows how often (normalized
between 0 and 1) an opcoded is chosen.
Duo Processor E8400 at 3.00GHz with 4.00GB of RAM. The
operating system environment is Windows 7 Enterprise.
We use DCVP to protect four x86 PE executables, namely
md53, gzip4, bcrypt5, mat_mul6. The first three are used
to process a text file (test.txt) of 10KB and mat mul
is used to calculate the product of two 5×5 matrices. Table I
shows the statistics of these executables. For each program,
we choose a piece of critical code to protect, as shown
in table I. The programs are protected 10 times, each time
with a parameter that specifies a different number (1∼10) of
partitions.
Figure 7 shows the code size of the obfuscated programs.
The horizontal axis specifies the number of partitions in the
obfuscated programs and “0” means the original program. As
the partitions increase, the increased bytes mostly come from
the added HATs and HAS. Since the size of a HAT is only
592 bytes, the sizes of the HATs increase slowly. Besides,
the sections in PE executables are aligned to a value (4096 or
512 usually)[31], the filesize of the program is mainly affected




5Bcrypt - Blowfish file encryption. http://sourceforge.net/projects/bcrypt/.
6Matrix Multiply. https://github.com/MartinThoma/matrix-multiplication.



















Fig. 7: The impact on code size (KB) of DCVP.
The file size slightly increased with the increase of
number of partitions



















Fig. 8: The impact on runtime performance (µs) of
DCVP with different partitions.





























Fig. 9: The average runtime overhead per dynam-
ically executed critical instruction.
To evaluate the runtime overhead that DCVP introduces,
we run the obfuscated programs for several times and cal-
culate the average execution time of them: md5, gzip, and
bcrypt are used to process a text file (test.txt) of 10KB;
matrix mul is used to calculate the product of two 5×5
matrices. The average execution time is shown in figure 8.
Among them, bcrypt has the largest increase of execution
time from original program7 to the obfuscated program with
one partition. This resulted from that the critical instructions
in bcrypt is executed much more times than others (as
shown in the last column in table I). Besides, the execution
time changes little as the number of partitions increases. From
section VII-B2 we can learn that if the number of partitions
increases by one, the program only needs to execute an extra
handler to interpret the switch HAT instruction. The
introduced runtime overhead is negligible. In some situations,
the execution time of an obfuscated program with more
partitions may have a slightly lower runtime overhead. This
probably is due to better data locality that leads to favourable
cache behaviors.
We evaluate the average runtime overhead per dynamically
executed instruction. We use Tob to denote the execution
time of a obfuscated program, To for that of the original
program, and Ce for the count of the critical instructions
been dynamically executed. The average runtime overhead per
dynamically executed instruction is calculated by
(Tob − To)/Ce.
The results are shown in figure 9. From this figure, we can
learn that md5 has the largest average runtime overhead per
dynamically executed instruction. The reason is that the critical
code of md5 is full of arithmetical and logical instructions,
which takes a longer time to interpret.
Finally, we compare DCVP to two commercial code virtu-
alization protection systems: VMProtect [8] and Themida [9].
Figure 10 shows the impact of the three virtualization protec-
tion system on the file size of the four target programs. The
cost of Themida is much greater than the other two system,
and the impact of DCVP and VMProtect is similar. This result
7The execution time of the original program is specified by “0” on the
horizontal axis.






















Fig. 10: The comparison of impact on file size (KB) with VMProtect and
Themida.






















Fig. 11: The comparison of runtime performance (µs) with VMProtect and
Themida.
should be related to the design of virtual instructions and
handlers. Runtime overhead as shown in Figure 11. In
general, the effects of the three protection systems are similar.
Special, the runtime overhead of bcrypt that protected by
Themida is far greater than the other target programs. This
may be related to the design of the Themida and the executed
number of critical instructions in bcrypt. According to above
comparison, we can see that DCVP is similar to VMProtect
in temporal and spatial overhead, and they are all better than
Themida.
IX. RELATED WORK
Code deobfuscation techniques have been proposed in
recent years. The representative researches are as follows,
Coogan et al. [25] proposed an approach to identify instruc-
tions that related to system calls, and automatically extract
an approximate dynamic trace of the original code. Yadegari
et al. [26], proposed an approach to track the flow of inputs
values, and then use semantics-preserving code transforma-
tions to simplify the logic of the instructions. These approach,
however, or can only extract some execution characteristics of
target program and can not restore the structure of the original
code completely, or needed taint analysis to track and analyze
the data flow, and this process may be impeded by enforcing
dataflow obfuscation to the handling procedures [21]. These
methods are limited more or less.
DCVP adopts ISR (Instruction Set Randomization) tech-
niques while generating randomized and distinct virtual in-
struction sets. ISR has been used to prevent code injection at-
tacks by randomizing the underlying system instructions [32],
[16], [33]. In this approach, instructions are encrypted with a
set of random keys and then decrypted before being fetched
and executed by the CPU. ISR is effective for defeating code
injection attacks but cannot prevent from reverse engineering
attacks. As in our attack model, software programs are exe-
cuted in a malicious host environment, where attackers are able
to trace and log the decrypted instructions for later analysis.
DCVP employs an approach similar to ISR while generating
random virtual instruction sets, by changing the relationship
between the opcodes and the virtual instructions [16], but it
never “decrypts” the virtual instructions back into their original
ones. Instead, DCVP uses handlers to interpret the virtual
instructions. and the handlers of virtual instructions are
more complex than their corresponding native instructions. Be-
sides, DCVP uses the multiple partitions and has the different
ISRs in a single program, making the reverse analyses even
more difficult and tedious.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented the DCVP, a VM-based
code obfuscation scheme. DCVP is designed to prevent code
reverse engineering attacks that use knowledge obtained from
programs protected under the same code obfuscation tech-
nique. At the core of DCVP is a novel strategy to diversify
the obfuscated program behavior. We achieve this by first
partitioning the protected code region to different segments;
then randomly mapping the opcode of each virtual instruction
from different segments to different bytecode handlers. As a
result, the mapping between a virtual instruction and native
code changes from one code segment to the other. This makes
the program behavior to be less predictable, increasing the dif-
ficulty for reusing knowledge obtained from other programs to
attack the target application. We have evaluated our approach
on a set of real-world applications and compared it against
state-of-the-art VM-based code protection tools. Experimental
results show that DCVP provides stronger protection at the
cost of little extract overhead.
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